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ABSTRACT. This paper focuses on the interactions between local communities having
at least some degree of informal claims over natural resources and firms interested in
commercially exploiting such resources, explicitly allowing for interventions by third
parties interested in community welfare and environmental outcomes. Integrating conflict
and bargaining theories, we develop a bargaining model with endogenous inside and
outside options, in which the feasibility and outcomes of a potential bargaining game
depend on the unraveling of a conflict stage and vice versa. The model implies that,
contrary to the conventional bargaining model, distribution and efficiency cease to be
separable. We show that certain third-party interventions in the bargaining process may
have unexpected and counterproductive effects.
1. Introduction
Most natural resources of great economic significance – e.g., oil, natural gas,
hydraulic resources for electricity generation, mines, and dense forests –
require capital-intensive technologies for their commercial exploitation
(Bohn and Deacon, 2000).1 In many countries an important portion of these
resources ‘belongs’ to local communities, although property rights are often
diffuse and not necessarily fully enforced by the government. Frequently,
these communities are poor, geographically isolated, and lack formal title
to the resources. As a consequence, they have difficulties in meeting the
collateral requirements to borrow the considerable funds needed to acquire
Funding for this research was provided by the Robert-Bosch Foundation. We
would like to thank Charles Palmer for useful discussions that have motivated
this research, and two anonymous reviewers as well as the guest editor of this
issue for important criticism and suggestions. An earlier version of this paper
was published as ZEF Discussion Paper No. 90 at the Center for Development
Research, University of Bonn.
1 It is possible to exploit some of these resources via more traditional labor-intensive
methods as well, albeit at a much reduced scale.
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the technology and capital necessary to commercially exploit the resources
by themselves (Bose, 1998). Thus, communities have to rely on specialized
firms for resource exploitation.
This paper focuses on the interactions between local communities having
at least some degree of informal claims over natural resources and firms
interested in commercially exploiting such resources. The analysis allows
for interventions by third parties (e.g., non-governmental agencies (NGOs),
international donors, and others interested in the welfare of communities
and in the environmental consequences of resource extraction) that often
are made to support communities in their interactions with firms. These
interactions may involve outright conflict over property rights where the
community needs to first show that it is able to exercise nominal rights over
the resource and thus prevent unilateral exploitation by the firms. If the
community succeeds in this, bargaining over the distribution of the benefits
of resource exploitation and over the intensity of resource extraction may
ensue. For reasons to be explained below the intensity of resource extraction
affects not only the size of the ‘cake’ but also its very distribution between
the bargaining parties; distribution and efficiency are not separable. We
show that in this context certain common interventions by third parties in
favor of the communities can have some paradoxical and environmentally
counterproductive effects.
Over the last decade, more than 60 countries worldwide have decentra-
lized at least some aspects of natural resource management (Ribot, 2002;
Kaimowitz, 2002a), which in many cases has led to some degree of control
over natural resources by local communities, a process frequently referred
to as ‘devolution’. Indonesia, South Africa, and Mexico, among many other
countries, now require that firms interested in exploiting natural resources
negotiate with local communities.2 Canada, Australia, and the United States
have recognized partial rights of indigenous groups to participate in the
management of forests, fisheries, and mines. This effectively allows com-
munities to bargain with other agents interested in exploiting the resources
(referred to hereafter as ‘the firm’), but does not necessarily preempt other
forms of interactions, including conflicts over de facto property rights.3
Three features characterize the devolution process in most countries.
First, the transfer of authority to local communities is often incomplete;
legal rights are diffused and little public enforcement of such rights is
provided (Ribot, 2002; Palmer, 2004; Feder and Feeny, 1991). Second, there
2 See, e.g., Palmer (2004), Barr et al. (2001), Bray et al. (2003), Mayers and Vermeulen
(2002), Ribot (2002), and World Development Report (2000/2001, 2003).
3 Examples: Barr et al. (2001) and Palmer (2004) describe conflicts over rights to
logging in Indonesia. In Ecuador, Occidental Petroleum agreed to significant
compensation of the Sehuaya community for the right to establish a test well
on community land (http://forests.org/archive/samerica/secoocid.htm). In 1996,
indigenous farmers in Chontal, Mexico blocked petroleum exploitation on their
lands until firms compensated them (http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/
reports/taboil.html). Native communities in the United States have renegotiated
coal leases and made oil and gas agreements (http://encarta.msn.com/
encyclopedia_761570777_30/Native_Americans_of_North_America.html).
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is external participation by NGOs, international donors and others affecting
the community–firm relationships.4 Third, in most countries firms cannot
purchase land or other communal resources either because communities
do not have formal legal title or because government regulations explicitly
impede it (Kaimowitz, 2002b). Firms thus have to rely on bargaining with
communities, or, alternatively, on exploiting the resource unilaterally, but
generally without being able to obtain formal property rights.
Despite the incompleteness of the transfer of authority to communities
and shortcomings in their implementation, decentralization and devolution
were expected to greatly reduce environmental degradation and to
significantly improve management of natural resources. This expectation
was based on the perception that these processes may contribute to
ameliorating property right imperfections. While there are certainly cases of
success, increasing empirical evidence indicates that these processes have
not always reduced resource degradation and, in some cases, have even
accelerated it.5
The model presented in this paper provides a consistent explanation for
this important stylized fact by showing that devolution, in combination
with certain generally accepted interventions, may lead to outcomes often
inconsistent with expectations. This paper makes three contributions to the
existing literature: first, unlike conventional analyses of the management of
communal resources, which focus on internal within-community governance
issues (e.g., Ostrom, 1990; Bardhan, 1993a,b; Baland and Platteau, 1996;
Agrawal, 2001), we concentrate on how external forces affect the patterns
of exploitation of natural resources. This is a vital issue in the context of
capital-intensive resource exploitation, which has been mostly ignored by
the literature (see also Bromley, this issue).
Second, we integrate conflict and bargaining theory in a way in which
the feasibility and outcomes of a potential bargaining game depend on
the unraveling of a conflict stage, and the conflict resolution is affected
by the potential outcome of a possible bargaining stage that may ensue.
Conflict analysis (e.g., Alston et al., 1999a,b; Angelsen, 2001; Hotte, 2001;
Burton, 2004) emphasizes conflicts over property rights. This literature
focuses exclusively on the conflict without allowing for the possibility that
actual or potential conflict may lead to negotiation or bargaining, and that
potential bargaining outcomes may affect conflict resolution. Bargaining
4 Another important third-party is the state. Governments intervene by setting
the institutional framework in the processes of decentralization and devolution.
Also, governments are responsible for not clearly delimiting property rights and
especially for failing to enforce communal rights (Larson and Ribot, 2004).
5 For example, Larson and Ribot (2004), summarizing a variety of studies on
decentralization in the natural resource sector, conclude that decentralization
has had mixed impacts on the environment. In Indonesia, decentralization
has led to increased logging with little regard to environmental consequences
(Resosudarmo, 2004; Casson and Obidzinski, 2002). See Walker (2000) and Lewis
(1995) for descriptions of dramatic cases of environmental destruction in large
part attributed to devolution and decentralization in South Africa and the USA,
respectively.
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models, on the other hand, do not explicitly consider the role of latent
conflict in bargaining outcomes (Muthoo, 1999).
Third, we formally model the effects of participation by third parties
in the bargaining process. An important implication of this is that inside
options, defined as the parties’ payoffs while in the process of bargaining
(Bulow and Rogof, 1989), are endogenous. This in turn results in distribution
and efficiency ceasing to be separable as implicitly assumed in the standard
bargaining model.
We show that third-party intervention in the bargaining process may
have unexpected and counterproductive effects. In particular, if at least
some third-party agents increase their support to communities where the
environmental threat is large (the ‘hotspot’ approach), bargaining may
result in a more intense resource exploitation and greater environmental
damage than without intervention. Paradoxically, the greater is the
bargaining power of the community vis-a`-vis the firm the more likely it
is that the effect of the hotspot intervention will magnify the environmental
damage. The hotspot effect is catalytic in nature: its existence does not
require that all or even the majority of the third-party agents use the hotspot
approach to intervene. Neither does it require that the external parties
actually intervene in the particular community–firm bargaining considered.
It suffices that a non-negligible subset of external agents uses it so that
the community and the firm will form expectations about the probability
that some third-party agent may intervene in such fashion. Once these
probabilities are incorporated in the bargaining game its outcome will lead
to the above results.
We show that explicitly modeling the linkages between conflict and
bargaining outcomes leads to non-trivial changes in the comparative
static results. Specifically, improvements in the community’s bargaining
power vis-a`-vis those of the firm are likely to increase resource extraction
and thereby to increase pressure on the environment. Moreover, an
increase in the wage rate may have continuous or discontinuous effects
on the environment, depending on initial conditions.6 We show that the
continuous effect generally corresponds to the standard comparative static
intuition (that is, an increase in the wage rate reduces environmental
degradation). The discontinuous effect, however, can be paradoxical.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
game-theoretic model. Section 3 examines the effect of alternative strategies
of intervention by third-party actors on the environment. Section 4 draws
conclusions on effective intervention strategies.
2. Modeling community–firm interactions
In what follows we use the terms ‘forest’ and ‘logging’ as metaphors but
we remind the reader that the problem can be equally expressed more
generally in terms of ‘resource’, and ‘resource extraction’. Similarly, the term
6 We denote the effect of a change of an exogenous variable as ‘discontinuous’ when
it is powerful enough to switch the nature of the game from conflict to bargaining
or vice-versa. By contrast, a ‘continuous’ effect occurs when the nature of the game
(either bargaining or conflict) is not altered by the exogenous change.
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‘community’ stands for any entity that has at least potential property rights
over a natural resource, but that cannot exploit it directly as a consequence
of, for example, lack of access to capital and technical expertise. The term
‘firm’ is used to denote any entity that does not have automatic access to
the resource, but has access to the capital and the know-how necessary to
exploit it.
2.1. Conflict
One common way to model conflict is as an attrition war (e.g., Dixit and
Nalebuff, 1991; Bulow and Klemperer, 1999). Most attrition models assume
that competing agents follow a strategy to gain property rights (or win other
types of conflicts). In our case, the strategy for the firm involves unilateral
logging attempts (without sharing the benefits with the community), while
for the community it consists of setting up blockades to prevent this from
happening and thus be able to exert de facto property rights. Blockades
are costly to the community, while the firm incurs a cost for any credible
logging attempt (e.g., labor costs would arise even if workers are hindered
from logging).
Our model differs slightly from most other war-of-attrition models in
that it uses an alternating action framework and allows for asymmetric
motivations of the two actors. A similar model was presented by Burton
(2004). We also follow Burton in modeling the conflict game as an infinite-
time-horizon game. Unlike Burton the ensuing analysis explicitly considers
the fact that conflict may potentially lead to bargaining and that the outcome
of a potential bargaining phase may affect conflict resolution.
Assumptions of the conflict game
In each period the firm can choose whether to make a unilateral logging
attempt or withdraw. The community then can choose whether to set up a
blockade or withdraw. It is assumed that setting up a blockade in a given
period will successfully stop the logging attempt in that period. The game
is repeated an infinite number of times unless one of the parties withdraws.
Logging requires forest area, variable inputs, and a specific factor, capital,
that is available to the firm but not to the community. Firm’s profits from
logging are v(w;L,K), where K is the exploitation capital, L is the area logged,
and w is a vector of wages, other variable input prices, and output price.
For simplicity of exposition we omit arguments other than L from v, except
when needed for comparative static purposes. The assumption that logging
requires a specific factor that is available only to the firm implies that the
firm has the ability to exploit the resource unilaterally while the community
may under some conditions be able to prevent such exploitation. We now
summarize the assumptions used in the ensuing model of conflict.
Assumption set A
(A1) The community and the firm have perfect information about each other’s
parameters.
(A2) v(w;L,K) is monotonic, homogeneous of degree one, increasing and concave
in L and K, and convex in w. Moreover, maxL v(L) > 0 (logging is
profitable).
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(A3) The firm’s discount rate (rF) and the community’s discount rate (rC) are
fixed and strictly positive. The discount factor for actor i (i = F, C) is defined
as δi ≡ 1/(1 + ri ).
(A4) There are fixed per-period costs of staying in conflict to communities, s (the
‘blockading’ costs), and to firms, c (the cost of unilateral logging attempts,
not including the opportunity cost of capital).
(A5) As an alternative to logging, the firm may invest its capital in the next best
activity, yielding exogenous profits of R
F ≡ ∑∞t=0 δtF gF = g
F
1−δF , where g
F
is the per period return in the next best activity and R
F
< maxL v(L).
(A6) The present value of the standing forest considered by the community is
h0 B(L − L) ≡ h0
∑∞
t=0 δ
t
C b(L − L) = h0b(L−L)1−δC , where the function b is the
per-period service provided by the standing forest, L is the total forest area
prior to exploitation, and h0 is the average value (or price) per unit of the
environmental service as considered by the community. The function b is
increasing and strictly concave in the level of standing forest. Furthermore,
b ≡ b(L) and 0 < h0 < h, where h is the true unit value of environmental
services provided by the standing forest. Finally, we assume that B(L −
Lˆ) = 0, where Lˆ ≡ arg max{v(L)}.
(A7) The community cannot make side payments to the firm, that is F ≤
v(L), where F is the firm’s total payoffs under a successful bargaining
agreement. Similarly, C is the community’s total payoff under the same
outcome.
Remark about (A6): The last sentence of (A6) implies that logging to
the extent that maximizes logging profits eliminates all standing value
of the forest to the community. This assumption is made for simplicity.7
The assumption that 0 < h0 < h reflects the fact that the standing forest
has values that the community does not necessarily internalize (e.g., water
retention, flood prevention, and erosion control services at the regional
level, carbon retention and biodiversity preservation at the global level).
Depending on the community’s level of awareness, it may also not even
consider all the local environmental values.
Remark about (A7): This assumption is justified for the following reasons.
First, communities are mostly poor and financially constrained due to lack
of access to credit. The lack of legal titles is an obstacle for communities
to obtain credit for lack of collateral. Second, the value of the standing
forest to the community is at least to a significant extent non-monetary,
including ecological functions, cultural values, and subsistence functions
(e.g., collection of non-timber forest products for self-consumption). (A7)
has an important implication for the rest of the analysis. It implies that
the ability of the community to establish and privately enforce de facto
property rights (that is, win the attrition war) is a necessary condition for
a successful bargaining agreement to emerge. If the firm is able to win a
7 In principle, there might still be some benefits of the logged forest to the
community. This could be incorporated in the model at the cost of further algebraic
clutter without changing the basic results.
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potential conflict, the community will effectively lose property rights to the
resource and, hence, the firm will exploit unilaterally. From assumption
(A7), the firm cannot benefit from negotiations in this case and thus has no
incentive to negotiate with the community.
Equilibria of the conflict game
We now examine the equilibria of the conflict game. Suppose a conflict
has continued until time t. The firm chooses a probability of withdrawal
from the conflict for that period, denoted by β t ∈ [0,1]. The model is
stationary: there are no information gains and benefits and costs do not
change over time. Thus, the problem faced by each actor is identical in
each period until one actor chooses to withdraw. We therefore restrict
our analysis to stationary solutions only, that is β t =β for all t. We now
examine the incentive for each actor to remain in conflict for an additional
period.
Consider first the firm’s incentives. It can either attempt to log without
community consent, incurring a cost c, or withdraw. If the firm withdraws,
there are two possibilities denoted by an index variable, p. If there are
gains from trade in bargaining (represented by p = 1), bargaining will be
successful and the firm receives negotiated payoffs F ; if there are no such
gains from trade (p = 0), the firm obtains its outside option RF . Thus, the
payoff from withdrawing is
Rw ≡ pF + (1 − p)RF . (1)
By contrast, if the firm remains in conflict, its payoffs depend on the
community’s reaction. Let γ t ∈ [0,1] be the (subjective) probability that
the firm attaches to the community’s withdrawal. For stationary solutions,
γ t = γ for all t. If the community withdraws, the logging attempt is
successful, yielding a logging profit for the firm of v(Lˆ). By contrast, if
a blockade occurs, the firm faces the same decision again. Let Rl denote the
expected payoff of a logging attempt. We can write
Rl = −c + γ v(Lˆ) + (1 − γ )δF Rl .
Solving for Rl, we get
Rl = −c + γ v(Lˆ)
1 − (1 − γ )δF . (2)
Thus the expected net benefits for the firm from remaining in conflict an
additional period are Rl − Rw. The firm is indifferent between withdrawing
and remaining in conflict if these net benefits equal zero, which is equivalent
to
γ = γ c ≡ c + R
w − δF Rw
v(Lˆ) − δF Rw
. (3)
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For values of γ below the critical value in (3), the firm would prefer to
withdraw immediately (choosing probability of withdrawal β∗ = 0), while
for γ ≥ γ c, it would remain in conflict (β∗ = 1).8
Let us now consider the incentives of the community. If the firm
has attempted to log unilaterally, the community can either accept this
and withdraw, or it can set up/maintain a blockade. If the community
withdraws immediately, it incurs no costs, but loses the forest to logging,
yielding zero benefits to the community (by assumption (A6)). If the
community maintains a blockade, it is assumed that the forest is protected in
the current period, yielding a benefit of h0b, but the community also incurs
blockading costs s. In addition, the longer-run fate of the forest depends on
the firm’s reaction to the blockade. If the firm withdraws (probability β),
there are two possibilities. Either negotiations over a logging agreement will
succeed (p = 1), in which case the community receives payoffs C, or there
are no gains from negotiation (p = 0). In the latter case, the community
receives the value of the standing forest also in all subsequent periods,
which can be written as δC h0 B(L). Thus, the community’s net benefits from
remaining in conflict (blockading) are
Rb = h0b − s + β[pC + (1 − p)δC h0 B(L)] + (1 − β)δC Rb , (4)
or
Rb = h0b − s + β[p
C + (1 − p)δC h0 B(L)]
1 − (1 − β)δC .
The community is indifferent between maintaining a blockade and
withdrawing if the net benefits from blockading (here given by Rb) are
equal to zero, that is if
β = βc ≡ s − h0b
pC + (1 − p)δC h0 B(L)
. (5)
For lower values of β, the community would withdraw immediately
(γ ∗ = 0), while for β ≥ βc, it would remain in conflict (γ ∗ = 1).
There are three stationary equilibria, two of which are pure strategy
equilibria and one which is a mixed strategy equilibrium. The mixed
strategy equilibrium occurs if each actor is indifferent between remaining in
conflict and withdrawing. The firm withdraws with a constant probability
given by equation (5), while the community withdraws with a constant
probability as given in (3). The outcomes of the mixed strategy equilibrium
are discussed in Kornhauser et al. (1989) and Burton (2004). However,
as argued there, the knife-edge requirement that both players are just
indifferent between strategies implies that this equilibrium is highly
unstable. Kornhauser et al. (1989) have shown that slight deviations from
8 Strictly speaking, the firm is indifferent when γ = γ c. For simplicity of exposition,
we assume that the firm remains in conflict in this case.
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the equilibrium lead to major responses in choices. In our case, if one of the
agents chose a probability of withdrawal just slightly below the equilibrium
level, the agent would win the conflict. Due to this instability we focus our
analysis on pure strategy equilibria.
There is one pure strategy equilibrium where the firm always withdraws
immediately, and the community always blockades (β∗ = 1, γ ∗ = 0), and
another where the firm always attempts to log and the community always
withdraws (β∗ = 0, γ ∗ = 1). For some parameter values, ‘always withdraw’
is clearly the dominant strategy. Consider first the case where the costs
of logging always exceed the gains, that is v(Lˆ) < c + Rw . Then the net
benefits from a logging attempt in (2) are always negative, regardless of
the community’s probability of withdrawal. In this case the firm always
withdraws (β∗ = 1). In what follows we focus on the case where logging is
profitable (that is v(Lˆ) > c + Rw).
Similarly, if the net cost of blockading even one period (s − h0b) exceeds
the expected value of winning the conflict, pC + (1 − p)δC B(L), the
community would always choose not to blockade γ ∗ = 1, regardless of
the firm’s strategy. Thus, as long as logging is profitable, the firm would
always log. Finally, if the community’s benefit from protecting the forest
for even one period (h0b) exceeds per-period blockading costs (s), the
community’s dominant strategy is to always blockade (γ ∗ = 0), regardless
of the firm’s strategy. Thus, it would be preferable to the firm to withdraw
immediately.
If h0b ≤ s ≤ h0b + pC + (1 − p)δC B(L), there is no dominant strategy
for either actor. We can, however, examine how changes in parameter
values will affect γ c and βc. Inspection of equation (3) indicates that γ c
is increasing in c and Rw. This is intuitive. For example, if logging becomes
more costly, the firm is generally more reluctant to attempt logging. It will
require a larger expected probability of community withdrawal to make
it worthwhile for the firm to opt for a logging attempt. Also, from (2), Rw
is higher for p = 1 than for p = 0. Similarly, inspection of (5) shows that
βc is increasing in s and decreasing in p and δC. This is also intuitive.
Higher blockading costs, the lack of gains from trade from negotiations,
and a higher time preference for present costs over future benefits, will
all raise the expected costs of blockading vis-a`-vis the expected benefits.
Thus the community becomes more reluctant to stay in conflict (or in
other words, requires a higher expected probability of firm withdrawal to
do so).
From the previous analysis, we have
Proposition 1. The likelihood that the community wins the conflict and thus that
privately enforced community property rights emerge increases if: (i) bargaining is
a feasible alternative to conflict (p = 1); (ii) the community’s discount factor is high
(discount rate is low) and the costs of fighting an attrition war are low vis-a`-vis
those of the firm.
As explained earlier, the outcome of the community–firm interaction is
asymmetric: if the firm is able to win a potential conflict, the community
will effectively lose property rights to the resource and, hence, the firm will
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exploit it unilaterally. Since the firm cannot benefit from negotiations in
this case, it has no incentive to negotiate with the community. If, however,
the community is able to win the war of attrition, then it effectively is
able to exert property rights over the resource and bargaining may be
successful.
2.2. Inside options in bargaining and third-party interventions9
Inside options are defined as the payoffs obtained by each player while
parties temporarily disagree and negotiations are ongoing. (A8) below
provides our assumptions on inside options.
(A8) Each player receives a flow of payoff gi in each period while negotiations
continue. For the firm this payoff is given by gF = gF; for the community
it is given by gC = h(L)b(L), where h0 ≤ h(L) ≤ h. We also refer to ‘the
inside option’ or di as the return to player i from perpetual disagreement
(that is, present value of receiving gi in each period forever). These are for
the firm d F = RF and for the community dC = h(L)B(L).
Thus, while the inside option of the firm is fixed corresponding to
the firm’s exogenous returns to its capital in the next best activity, the
community’s inside option may be affected by interventions of third
parties, such as NGOs, international donor agencies, and others. Cash
payments and other benefits given by these third parties are often directed
to enhancing the value of the environment to communities with the purpose
of internalizing a greater portion of the environmental externalities. Given
the naturally limited amount of financial resources available to third-
party agents and the large number of areas where such agents can act,
interventions generally prioritize areas where the environmental threat
is judged to be great. Some important conservation groups, such as
Conservation International and several others, have explicit strategies of
intervention consisting in focusing their activities on global ‘hotspots’, that
is areas that are under high pressure of deforestation and at the same
time rich in biodiversity.10 In other words, third-party interventions are
often guided by the ‘support communities which face the greatest environmental
threats’ (SGET) principle.11
The existence of SGET behavior is built into the communities’ and firms’
expectations.12 The fact that third parties normally exhibit SGET induces
9 The analysis here focuses on the case where the community wins the attrition
conflict, which is the interesting one from our perspective. If the community is
not able to enforce its rights (loses the attrition war), there is no community−firm
bargaining. Of course in this case governments or other entities may still intervene
to prevent the firm from logging, but this is just the standard public policy
regulation problem.
10 See www.conservation.org and www.biodiversityhotspots.org.
11 Of course, not all interventions are guided by the SGET principle. Later we
consider other types of intervention.
12 Under SGET interventions we may assume that h(L) = h0 + h˜(L − L). Thus, the
unit price that the community receives for the environmental service that it
provides, h(L), is comprised of the benefit per unit of environmental service directly
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firms and communities to expect that the community’s valuation of the
standing forest would be enhanced by the support from third parties; that
is the community’s inside option becomes endogenous and increasing in the
level of logging being negotiated. With perfect information, the first offer
will fully take into consideration the fact that, if the negotiations were to
become protracted, the community could easily announce the logging threat
and thus enhance its inside option by attracting support from third parties
(which is increasing in the logging threat being negotiated). However, given
perfect information the negotiation never actually gets protracted. The first
offer takes into consideration all the relevant information. Thus, (A8) does
not require actual outside intervention, the mere fact that such a possibility
is known to exist on the basis of observed past behavior is sufficient to affect
the outcome of the bargaining through its effect on the community’s inside
option. Of course under certain conditions (influenced by the community’s
inside option among other variables as we will see below) there might not
be any offer at all, there is no solution to the bargaining, which means that
there is no logging. Hence, while third parties do not in fact intervene, they
still influence the outcome of the bargaining (including whether or not it is
successful). This also implies that the importance of SGET interventions is
likely to be large even if only a small subset of third-party agents applies
such a rule.13
The next four remarks are essential to understand the meaning of the
bargaining model.
Remarks
(1) With perfect information, positive time discount rates, and assuming
certain feasibility conditions, the (perfect) first offer in an alternating
offers bargaining game fully incorporates all the relevant information.
The first offer is instantaneously accepted and the bargaining process
takes no real time. Or, alternatively, depending on the parameters of
obtained by the community (h0) plus the expected premium for environmental
services paid by third parties, h˜(L − L). The expected unit price premium paid
by third parties is assumed to increase at a decreasing rate with the scarcity
of the environmental service supplied (h˜′ < 0 and h˜′′ < 0). The term h˜(L − L)
may include the provision of technical support, education, and conservation
monetary payments to the communities in order to raise environmental values
and awareness provided through SGET interventions.
13 If the bargaining parties are risk neutral, their first offer will use the probability of
intervention by an SGET ruler in calculating the expected level of the community’s
inside option associated with a given level of L. The expected unit price premium for
the environmental service h˜ could be written as h˜(L − L) = q (L − L)m, where 0 ≤
q ≤ 1 is the probability that any third-party agent may intervene using an SGET
rule, and m is the payment premium per unit of standing forest. The probability
q is assumed increasing in L. Note that there is no need that the actual payment
premium, m, be also increasing in L. Even if it is fixed, the function h˜(L − L) is
increasing in L. Thus, as long as q is non-negligible (as long as some third-party
agents may intervene using an SGET rule), the expected inside option of the
community is increasing in L.
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the model there might be no offer at all in which case the game is over
and there is no logging.
(2) The first offer (or lack of offer) takes into consideration the fact
that, if there was no instantaneous agreement and negotiation took
real time instead, third parties would be informed about it and that
their expected support to the community would increase with the
magnitude of the perceived environmental threat (represented by the
expected deforestation resulting from the bargaining process).
(3) The bargaining agreement is thus instantaneous, but the actual
agreement takes full consideration of what would happen if the
process of alternating offers took real time.14
(4) The community’s inside option is not dependent on the bargaining
outcome of the specific game under analysis, it only depends on the ex-
ante expectations that the firm and community have regarding SGET
interventions based on past observed behavior by third parties.
SGET interventions cause the unit price of environmental services to
increase when environmental services become scarcer. It would, however,
be inappropriate to assume that such interventions cause the total
environmental value to increase as the environment is degraded. To avoid
this possibility we assume that h(L)B(L − L) is non-increasing in L. Below
we summarize the assumptions concerning SGET interventions:
Assumption set B
(B1) With SGET interventions, the unit price of environmental service perceived
by the community increases at a strictly decreasing rate as environmental
services become scarcer, h′(L) > 0 and h′′(L) < 0.
(B2) With SGET interventions, the total value of the environmental service,
h(L)B(L − L), is non-increasing in L ∈ [0, L]; that is, h′(L)B(L − L) −
h(L)B ′(L − L) ≤ 0.
In the analysis below in section 2.5, we probe the implication of this
type of intervention by comparing the outcome of the bargaining game
with SGET interventions (h′(L) > 0) and without (h′(L) = 0). In addition, in
section 3, we compare the effects of other types of intervention (not guided
by the SGET principle) with and without SGET interventions.
2.3. Bargaining
We now analyze the outcomes of community–firm bargaining when the
community wins de facto property rights. We assume a Rubinstein-type
bargaining where community and firm make alternating offers to define a
mutually agreed logging contract. This is a bargaining game with inside
and outside options. Unlike in conventional bargaining games, however,
14 If this was not the case, the resulting bargaining agreement would not be stable
ex post; the community’s inside option would increase as a response to intervention
and thus the community would have an incentive to renegotiate the agreement.
Here we avoid modeling renegotiation explicitly to keep the model as simple as
possible, and instead use the same logic followed by Rubinstein (1982).
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the size of the ‘cake’ is here endogenous and its size has consequences for
its distribution. The firm and the community bargain not only for their
respective shares of the extracted output but also for the intensity of the
exploitation, that is for the determination of the value of the resource
extracted. For presentation purposes we consider bargaining over the
distribution of the total net benefits and bargaining over the level of logging
separately; that is, we first study how benefits are distributed conditional
on a logging level, and then we analyze the determination of the logging
level.15
Below we show that with SGET interventions the distribution and the
size of the cake negotiated over are no longer separable. The intuition for
this result can be anticipated as follows. When considering its desired level
of logging under a negotiated agreement, the firm will take into account
the fact that greater logging may induce third-party interventions, which
in turn raise the community’s inside option, leading to a greater share of
‘the cake’ for the community. Therefore, the firm prefers a smaller level of
logging intensity than the one that would maximize the size of ‘the cake’. If
side payments could be made by the community to the firm, then choosing a
logging level that maximizes ‘the cake’ would always be Pareto-improving;
the community could compensate the firm and keep the rest of the benefits
from a larger ‘cake’. However, given assumption (A7), this is not possible
here. The community cannot make side payments to convince the firm to
accept a higher logging level. Thus the firm is stuck with having to trade
off an increased logging level with trying to keep the community’s inside
option (and thus its share of ‘the cake’ obtained in bargaining) down. As
we show below, this will lead to a negotiated logging intensity below the
level that would maximize ‘the cake’, unless the community has perfect
bargaining power.
Bargaining over payments
Muthoo (1999) has shown that the solution to the alternating-offers
bargaining game with inside and outside options can be presented in the
form of an asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Thus, the payments
to the community and firm out of a given total revenue (or, equivalently,
conditional on a given level of L) are obtained by solving
max
F ,C
[F − d F ]τ [C − dC ]1−τ s.t. F ≥ d F , C ≥ dC , F + C = (L),
(6)
where τ = rc/(rc + rF) is the firm’s bargaining power vis-a`-vis the
community, and (L) are the total net benefits to the two players under
15 This does not mean that we assume that the two processes are sequential. The
approach is often used in other areas of economics, e.g. in production theory
it is common to define a (dual) cost function conditional on any arbitrary level
of output and then define an optimal level of (profit maximizing) output by
maximizing revenue less the input cost as represented by the cost function, thus
choosing one particular level of output (Chambers, 1988). Thus, one can always
separate the problem into two stages for presentation purposes.
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the logging agreement (‘the size of the cake’). The latter include the firm’s
logging profits as well as the value of the remaining forest to the community,
that is
(L) = v(L) + h(L)B(L − L). (7)
The constraints in (6) imply that each player has to obtain at least the value
of his inside option (defined, as in (A8), as the sum of per-period benefits
from disagreement while negotiating over time), and that total payments
have to add up to the total net benefits to be divided. These conditions are
discussed further in section 2.4.
Assuming an interior solution, and using (A7), equilibrium payments
can be written as
F = RF + τG(L) (8)
and C = h(L)B(L) + (1 − τ )G(L), (9)
where G(L) = (L) − RF − h(L)B(L). (10)
G(L) is the surplus left after paying both players their inside options.
Thus, each player obtains the value of his inside option plus a share (τ )
of the surplus (G(L)) that is inversely proportional to the player’s discount
rate.
Bargaining over logging intensity
We now consider bargaining over logging area, which in turn determines
the total net benefits to be divided, . Note that from equations (8) and
(9), however, L determines not only  but also its distribution between the
players. The firm’s preferred choice of L (denoted by LF) is the one that
maximizes its own payoffs under the logging agreement. From (8), this is
equivalent to the level of L that maximizes the surplus (G(L)), that is LF is
defined by
′(L F ) = h′(L F )B(L). (11)
Thus, the firm would want to equate the marginal benefit of logging
to the marginal cost of logging faced by the firm. We expect this to be
the level of logging resulting when the firm has perfect bargaining power
(τ = 1).
By contrast, the community’s preferred level of logging (LC) is the one
that maximizes C, given by (9). Thus
′(LC ) = − τ
1 − τ h
′(LC )B(L). (12)
Contrary to the firm, the community considers the effect of logging on its
own reservation utility as a benefit. However, the community will be able
to fully impose its optimal level of logging (LC) only if it has full bargaining
power, that is if τ = 0. In that case (12) becomes
′(LC |τ=0) = 0. (13)
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When the community has perfect bargaining power, it receives all the
surplus beyond the firm’s inside options, and therefore does not consider
the effect on its own inside options. Concavity of v and h in L implies that
LC |τ=0 > L F .
The bargained level of L will generally lie somewhere in between the
values preferred by the two players. The bargaining game that determines
L can be represented by the following Nash bargaining problem16
max
L
[R
F + τG(L)]τ [h(L)B(L) + (1 − τ )G(L)]1−τ . (14)
The nature of this bargaining game is the following: each player bargains
for a level of L that is as close as possible to the level of L that maximizes
his or her benefits. In principle both players would like the total benefits
(including the environmental benefits) to be as large as possible, but
only to the extent that increasing total benefit does not reduce their
respective incomes. In the appendix (section A.1) we show that the first-
order condition can be written as
′(L˜) = κh′(L˜)B(L), (15)
where κ ≡ [ (
˜C
˜F
+1)τ 2−τ
τ 2 ˜
C
˜F
+(1−τ )2 ], L˜ denotes the equilibrium level of logging
emerging from bargaining, and ˜i is the equilibrium payment to player
i, defined by equations (8) and (9) and evaluated at L˜ .
Lemma 1. 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1, κ(τ = 0) = 0 and κ(τ = 1) = 1.
Proof. See appendix (section A.2). 
Lemma 1 implies that the cases where either player has perfect bargaining
power (τ = 1 or τ = 0) are boundary cases of equation (15); that is, for τ = 1,
condition (15) reduces to equation (11), and the firm’s preferred level of
logging emerges (L˜ = L F ). The firm exploits the fact that increasing L raises
the community’s inside options. Similarly, if τ = 0, the equilibrium level
of logging is L˜ = LC |τ=0, as defined in equation (13). If both parties truly
bargain (0 < τ < 1), the solution will only partially capture the effect of L
on h (that is, 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1). We thus have:
Lemma 2. Assume SGET interventions are in place (h′(L) > 0). For 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1,
L F ≤ L˜ ≤ LC |τ=0. Moreover, ∂ L˜∂τ < 0.
Proof. See appendix (section A.2).
Lemma 2 implies that the higher the bargaining power of the firm, the
lower the level of logging negotiated. Thus, contrary to what is often
assumed, a higher bargaining power of the community leads to more
intense resource exploitation.
16 Proof available from the authors upon request.
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If h′(L) = 0, that is in the absence of SGET interventions, then it is clear that
L F = LC = L˜ NI , where ′(L˜ NI ) = 0. In this case the level of L˜ NI maximizes
the size of the ‘cake’ available for distribution between the players and is
independent of the degree of bargaining power (∂ L˜ NI /∂τ = 0). Lemma 3
summarizes this result:
Lemma 3. Assume that no SGET interventions are in place (h′(L) = 0). Then
L F = LC = L˜ NI (where L˜ NI is the NBS in the absence of intervention) and
∂ L˜ NI /∂τ = 0.
2.4. Outside options revisited
There are two ways in which outside options matter for bargaining results
(Muthoo, 1999). First, the NBS presented above is valid only if the resulting
payment to player i (˜i ) is at least as large as the value of player is outside
option. Otherwise, player i will simply obtain the value of his outside option
in bargaining and the other player will receive the residual net benefits from
bargaining (Binmore, 1985). Second, if the sum of outside options exceeds
the total net bargaining benefits, bargaining will fail. Players in this case
will obtain their respective outside option.
Our analysis in section 2.1 implies that the community’s and the firm’s
outside options in bargaining (denoted as RC and RF, respectively) depend
crucially on which of the two parties is able to establish de facto property
rights. In the case considered here, where the community wins the war of
attrition, outside options are given by
RC = h0 B(L) and RF = RF . (16)
Now note that if G(L˜) ≥ 0 (there are gains from bargaining), the payment
to the community derived under the NBS always at least weakly exceeds
the value of the community’s outside option
C = h(L˜)B(L) + (1 − τ )G(L) ≥ h0 B(L), (17)
since h(L˜) ≥ h0. This happens because the community’s inside and outside
options are closely related; they both reflect the value of the standing forest
in the absence of logging. The only difference is that inside options may
be positively affected by greater third-party interventions in response to
negotiations. Therefore, the community can never lose, but may in fact
gain, from negotiations in terms of both an increase in its inside option and
a share of logging profits.
Because the firm’s inside and outside options are identical, namely the
value of the firm’s capital in the next best alternative activity, the payment
to the firm under the NBS also always at least weakly exceeds the value of
the firm’s outside option
F = RF + τG(L) ≥ RF . (18)
By the same argument, we have
Lemma 4. If G(L˜) ≥ 0, and the community can establish de facto property rights,
then RF + RC ≤ (L˜). Thus, bargaining takes place.
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Proof. The result follows directly from adding up equations (17) and (18),
and using equation (10). 
2.5. The effects of SGET interventions
The socially optimal level of logging (L∗) is the one that equates marginal
profits from logging to the true marginal environmental damages for society
as a whole
v′(L∗) = h B ′(L − L∗). (19)
This needs to be distinguished from the optimum for the community–
firm complex (LCFC), which is given by the level of logging resulting if the
community and the firm could coordinate to maximize the total net benefits
from an agreement, (L). LCFC is identical to LC |τ=0 and – using (7) – is given
by
v′(LCFC) + h′(LCFC)B(L − LCFC) = h(LCFC)B ′(L − LCFC). (20)
There are two differences between the social optimum and the optimum
for the community–firm complex. First, as is well known, the community–
firm complex does not generally consider externalities beyond the local level
and thus undervalues environmental damages from logging (h(L) ≤ h). If
outside interventions are responsive to logging, there is an additional effect:
the community and the firm, by increasing the area logged, can induce third-
party interventions that increase the benefits to the community obtained
from the remaining forest, that is they can increase the size of the cake
to be divided. This implies an additional marginal benefit of logging to
the two actors in negotiations. Thus, third-party interventions that increase
the unit value of the standing forest when threatened could lead to an
even greater over-exploitation of the resource than without intervention.
Inspection of (19) and (20) shows that LCFC > L∗. When the firm has some
positive bargaining power (τ > 0), the above effects are, in part, counteracted
by the fact that the firm considers the effect of logging in increasing the
community’s inside option. Formally, we have:
Proposition 2 (Role of interventions on environmental distortion).
(a) Without intervention, bargaining will lead to a solution that implies
L˜ NI > L∗.
(b) With SGET interventions:
(b.1) If τ = 0, then L˜ > L˜ NI , that is the initial distortion is worsened by
intervention.
(b.2) If τ = 1, then L˜ < L˜ NI , that is the initial distortion is at least partially
counteracted by intervention.
(b.3) If 0 < τ < 1, then the effect of intervention on the distortion is
ambiguous. L˜ > L˜ NI if and only if v′(L˜) − h(L˜)B ′(L − L˜) < 0.
Proof. See appendix (section A.3).
Proposition 2 implies that the greater the bargaining power of the
community, the more likely it is that the distortion is worsened by
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intervention (L˜ > L˜ NI ). The intuition of this result is the following:
increasing L beyond L˜ NI leads to a reduction in the amount of standing
forest that the community can use for non-logging purposes, and it reduces
the size of the total pie to be shared with the firm ((L)). However, with SGET
interventions the community increases its share of the pie when L˜ > L˜ NI .
Hence, SGET will induce the community to seek a level of L which is
larger than L˜ NI along the bargaining process. If the community has absolute
bargaining power (τ = 0), then it will be able to force a level of L which is
above L˜ NI . If the community has no bargaining power (τ = 1), it will not be
able to force any increase in L.
There is of course a critical level of τ below which the perverse
result of the SGET intervention will hold. However, part (b.3) of the
proposition implies that the distortion is more likely to be worsened by
SGET intervention where logging reductions are most needed. To see
this, note that v′(L˜) − h(L˜)B ′(L − L˜) is the true marginal value of forest
to the community–firm complex (or the effect of logging on total net
benefits when interventions are not sensitive to logging). If this is negative,
further deforestation reduces the total benefits of the community–firm
complex. This can be considered the case where adequate interventions
are most needed. However, the proposition shows that, in this case, SGET
interventions make things worse (that is, they increase the initial distortion).
This result is consistent with studies showing that decentralization has had
mixed impacts on the environment (see footnote 5).
3. The effect of alternative strategies of third-party interventions
We now discuss the environmental impacts of various other interventions.
In particular, we discuss three general types of intervention: (i) interventions
affecting de facto property rights; (ii) interventions affecting bargaining
power; and (iii) changes in the opportunity cost of labor.
3.1. Interventions affecting de facto property rights
One way in which third-party actors can try to influence the outcome
of community–firm interactions is by affecting the outcome of the latent
conflict over de facto property rights. In particular, third parties can intervene
to affect parameter values to induce a shift in the outcome of the property
rights game from open access and unilateral logging by the firm to
community property rights and negotiation. For example, by proposition
1, this could be achieved through an increase in c or a decrease in s. Third
parties could, for example, lower the level of s by improving the capacity
of communities to blockade.
Proposition 3 (Unilateral vs. bargained logging). If assumption B2 holds,
then the bargain-determined level of logging is less than or equal to the unilaterally
determined level, that is L˜ ≤ Lˆ∀τ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. See appendix (section A.4).
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Thus, interventions shifting the outcome of the attrition war from
unilateral logging to a situation where the community can enforce its
property rights are expected to reduce resource extraction.
3.2. Interventions affecting bargaining power (with and without SGET)
Third-party actors may intervene by changing the effective relative
bargaining power in favor of the community. For example, third parties
can attempt to lower the community’s discount rate through anti-poverty
measures, subsidized credit lowering the marginal cost of capital, or
by improving tenure security or increasing economic stability. Such
interventions reduce the level of rC (increase δC) and thereby reduce τ .
To see the impact of such interventions on logging we need to distinguish
two effects: (i) a continuous effect on the bargaining outcome; and (ii) a
potential discontinuous effect on the outcome of the attrition war.
In the case where bargaining takes place and SGET intervention is in
place, lemma 2 applies, and thus ∂L/∂τ < 0. Thus, contrary to conventional
views, interventions improving the community’s bargaining power harm
the environment by leading to increased logging under a bargained
agreement. If SGET is not in place, then lemma 3 applies; interventions
that increase the community bargaining power have no effect on logging.
That is, the policy intervention is ineffective in achieving environmental
improvements. These are the possible continuous effects.
The (discontinuous) effect on the outcome of the attrition war is that an
increase in the discount factor (δC) lowers the critical level of βC in equation
(5). As stated in proposition 1, this implies that the community’s ability to
stay in conflict increases. This does not mean, however, that the community
will necessarily win property rights; it only implies that it will have a greater
chance to win the contest. If the increase in δC is not sufficiently large, the
outcome of the conflict game may not be altered. We summarize these
results in proposition 4.
Proposition 4 (Effects of increases in community bargaining power).
Interventions that increase the community’s bargaining power may cause an
increase in resource extraction. In particular, this is the case when bargaining
takes place and SGET policies are in place (continuous effect). By contrast, an
increase in community’s bargaining power increases its ability to secure de facto
property rights (discontinuous effect). This increased ability does not necessarily
mean, however, that the intervention will cause the community to win the conflict;
neither does it ensure that resource extraction will decrease.
3.3. Interventions affecting the opportunity cost of labor
We can distinguish two types of changes affecting the opportunity cost
of labor. First, local interventions may increase the marginal product of
labor in a segment of the labor market, affecting the opportunity cost of
labor of the community, but not of the labor used by the firm. For example,
intervention may increase access to improved agricultural or processing
technologies or provide alternative employment opportunities within the
community, in a setting where the firm does not hire community labor
for resource extraction activities. Second, economic growth or macro-level
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interventions directed to the labor market may change wages faced by both
the firm and the community labor.17
The effect in the first case is straightforward. Assuming the firm draws its
labor out of the general labor market and not from the community, the only
effect of an increase in the community members’ opportunity cost of time
(w˜) is to raise the cost of blockading (s). By proposition 1, this means that
communities will be less likely to win the attrition war, and thus it is more
likely that the outcome will be a loss of property rights for the community.
Thus, bargaining is less likely to take place, and communities are less likely
to benefit from the exploitation of the resource. By analogy to the discussion
in section 3.1, a shift from a negotiated outcome to unilateral logging by the
firm is likely to induce an increase in the extent of logging.
The impact of interventions that increase market wages faced by
community members and the firm is more complex. There are three effects
on the outcome of the conflict game: (i) s increases as before, (ii) v(L ; w)
decreases, and (iii) C decreases. In general, the net effect on the outcome of
the attrition war is indeterminate. If, however, the firm’s operation is very
capital-intensive, and, hence, less labor-intensive than the community’s
blockading operation, then it is more likely that the first effect will dominate.
In this case the net effect will be again that the community is less likely to
acquire property rights, and the effect on logging is exactly as discussed in
the case of a more local change in the opportunity costs of labor. If, however,
a bargaining equilibrium exists before and after the change in market wages,
then the wage effect in a bargaining context will under plausible conditions
be in the expected direction, that is less logging.18
We present the main effect of labor market interventions in proposi-
tion 5 below.
Proposition 5 (Effects of increases in opportunity costs of labor). Increasing
the community’s opportunity cost of labor causes an increase of blockading costs.
If blockading costs are sufficiently sensitive to the opportunity costs of labor, this
may prevent the community from achieving property rights. In this case, the result
may be increased environmental pressure.
It is usually thought that economic development reduces the pressure on
natural resources and induces more tenure security. By contrast, proposition
5 indicates that in the absence of public enforcement of property rights,
economic development, by raising communities’ opportunity costs of
property rights self-enforcement, may enhance the potential for invasion of
community lands by commercial interests and increase resource extraction.
17 An example of the second type of intervention is a job creation program supported
by the government and of sufficient magnitude to affect the economy’s market
wage.
18 Inspecting the first-order conditions it can be shown that a sufficient condition for
this result is that ∂2ν/∂L∂w be negative. Using Hotelling’s lemma, ∂2v/∂L∂w =
−∂mF /∂L , where mF denotes the optimal level of labor use by the firm, that is
employment by the firm should be increasing in the area logged.
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4. Conclusions
Consider a community that satisfies all the desirable conditions for
collective action that have been emphasized in the literature on the
management of local commons. In the view of this literature, we would
expect resources to be managed efficiently then. If, however, this community
is subject to sufficiently powerful external interests, its desirable collective
action characteristics would not necessarily prevent the community from
losing effective property rights and would not protect the common resource
from excessive degradation. The reason for this is clear. While collective
action may influence certain aspects of the strength of a community’s ability
to face conflict with external actors, there are other factors, generally ignored
by the collective action literature that will determine the final outcome of
a potential conflict. Even if the community is able to withstand outside
challenges it may still be in need of negotiating joint exploitation of the
resource with outside agents. Once again, the theory of collective action
gives little guidance on how such bargaining would take place and what
its consequences would be.
In this paper we have developed a framework that emphasizes important
community interactions with external agents ignored by the collective
action literature. We have shown that the nature of these interactions
critically affects the management of natural resources. Interactions are
important not only because communities may unwillingly be faced with
external agents (e.g., commercial interests demanding communal resources,
especially during times of commodity booms). Cooperation with external
agents may also be the most effective way of exploiting certain resources,
particularly those requiring large capital investments for their exploitation.
We have derived a conceptual approach that naturally leads to an
explanation of the birth of effective property rights or, alternatively, their
abortion.
Conditional on the development and community enforcement of
property rights, we have identified important factors that determine the
outcomes of negotiations between communities and external agents. In
addition, we have shown some unexpected results concerning the effect
of third-party interventions on the environment that should be important
to policymakers interested in mitigating the negative environmental
consequences of resource exploitation. In particular, our results imply that
the effectiveness of third-party interventions depends crucially on initial
conditions. Certain interventions often favored by NGOs, governments
and international organizations, have been shown to be ineffective or
even counterproductive. Though we have highlighted policies that are
likely to have paradoxical effects, there are other policies that have
the expected impacts in ameliorating the environmental externalities of
resource extraction.
An emerging stylized fact suggesting that increasing the rights over
natural resources for local communities has often failed to halt natural
resource degradation and sometimes even worsened their management
is consistent with many of the results shown in this paper. These
counterproductive effects appear to emerge from the fact that devolution
has generally assigned partial and mostly ambiguous property rights
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over the resources to the communities instead of formal and publicly
enforced rights. This makes it harder for communities to access capital
markets and the technologies needed to exploit their natural resources.
Some communities thus become disadvantaged vis-a`-vis firms if bargaining
takes place and some others simply lose any potential rights on the
resources. The relatively handicapped position of communities, in turn,
induces interventions to shield them from unfair contest that sometimes
are counterproductive.
Though under certain conditions private enforcement of property rights
endogenously emerges, it is clear that this process is only an imperfect
substitute for legal and publicly enforced property rights. Failure to publicly
establish and enforce such rights increases the likelihood that the process
of devolution may not only worsen resource management but also cause
certain seemingly plausible policies to backfire. The key message of this
paper is that under partial and contestable property rights the road to
effective intervention is indeed quite uncertain.
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Appendix
A.1. Derivation of first-order condition (15)
Using a logarithmic transformation and the definition dC (L) = h(L)B(L),
the objective function in (14) can be rewritten as
max
L
τ ln[R
F + τG(L)] + (1 − τ ) ln[dC (L) + (1 − τ )G(L)].
The first-order condition for the bargaining problem specified in (14) can
thus be written as
τG ′(L)
d¯ F + τG(L) = −
1 − τ
τ
dC ′(L) + (1 − τ )G ′(L)
dC (L) + (1 − τ )G(L) , or equivalently,
τ 2G ′(L)
F
+ (1 − τ )d
C ′(L) + (1 − τ )2G ′(L)
C
= 0.
Some further manipulation yields
[
τ 2
C
F
+ (1 − τ )2
]
G ′(L) + (1 − τ )dC ′(L) = 0.
Substituting for G ′(L) = ′(L) − dC ′(L) (from equation (10) and dC (L) =
h(L)B(L)), we can rewrite
[
τ 2
C
F
+ (1 − τ )2
]
′(L) +
[
τ −
(
C
F
+ 1
)
τ 2
]
dC ′(L) = 0.
This expression is of course equivalent to equation (15).
A.2. Proof of lemmas 1 and 2
Substituting for τ = 0 and τ = 1 in the expression for κ given below (15)
immediately yields the second part of lemma 1. Moreover, we can rewrite
κ as
κ(L ; α, τ ) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢
⎣
(α + 1) − 1
τ
α +
(
1 − τ
τ
)2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥
⎦
,
where α ≡ α(τ ) = C
F
= h(L˜)B(L)+(1−τ )G(L˜)
R
F +τG(L˜) .
It is easy to see by inspection, that the direct effect of τ on κ is positive
(that is, ∂κ
∂τ
> 0). Moreover, the effect of α on κ is also positive since
∂κ
∂α
=
α +
(
1 − τ
τ
)2
−
[
(α + 1) − 1
τ
]
[
α +
(
1 − τ
τ
)2]2
=
(
1 − τ
τ
)2
+ 1
τ
− 1
[
α +
(
1 − τ
τ
)2]2
> 0
for 0 < τ < 1. Also, inspection of the definition of α shows that dαdτ > 0.
Therefore, it follows that dκdτ ≡ ∂κ∂τ + ∂κ∂α dαdτ > 0. Together these two results
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imply that 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 (first part of lemma 1). Lemma 2 follows directly from
the previous results, equation (15), and the concavity of . 
A.3. Proof of proposition 2
From equations (15), (7), and (A8) we have that
v′(L˜) = h(L˜)B ′(L − L˜) + h′(L˜)[κB(L) − B(L − L˜)]. (a.1)
In the absence of intervention, h′(L˜) = 0. Result (a) follows immediately
from (a.1) together with the concavity of v, and the fact that h(L) < h. If
τ = 0, then κ = 0, so the second term on the right-hand side (RHS) of (a.1)
is negative, implying that the distortion is worsened (result b.1). If τ = 1,
then κ = 1, so the second RHS term in (a.1) is positive, implying that the
distortion is reduced (result b.2). For 0 < τ < 1, 0 < κ < 1, the sign of the
second RHS term in (a.1) is ambiguous. The closer to zero τ is, the more
likely the sign of the expression in (b.3) is negative. 
A.4. Proof of proposition 3
By the concavity of v, L˜ ≤ Lˆ if and only if v′(L˜) ≥ v′(Lˆ). Now compare the
first-order condition for L˜ (equation (15)) to that for Lˆ , which is given by
v′(Lˆ) = 0. Then v′(L˜) ≥ v′(Lˆ) holds ∀τ ∈ [0, 1] if and only if N ≡ h(L˜)B ′(L −
L˜) + h′(L˜)[κB(L) − B(L − L˜)] ≥ 0 for all τ ∈ [0, 1], (or equivalently, for all
κ ∈ [0, 1]). Let M(L) ≡ h(L)B(L − L). Since N reaches a minimum at κ =
τ = 0, it suffices to show that N|κ=τ=0 ≥ 0. Moreover, since in this case
N =−dM/dL, the condition N ≥ 0 for all τ ∈ [0, 1] holds if and only if
dM/dL ≤ 0. That is, if assumption B2 holds. 
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